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EX-MENTAL PATIENIS HAVE RIGHTS TO
L IMNODUCrION
Our nation's mentally ill population, at one time warehoused
under deplorable conditions in state and privately run institutions,'
is no longer "out of sight, out of mind."' In the past two decades,
compassionate civil rights attorneys and mental health advocacy
groups have won long-over-due recognition of legal rights for this
once ill regarded populace? Treatment in mental institutions has
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Professor Michael L. Perlin for his helpful
suggestions and criticisms.
1. See A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THEIR CARE AND
TREATMENT FROM COLONIAL TIMES (2d ed. 1949); A. DEutsCH, THE SHAME OF THE STATES
(1973) (comparing the conditions in American state mental hospitals with the horrors of Nazi
concentration camps). See also S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1985); A BRooKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM (1974) (for an excellent list of articles which explore the prevalent conditions in
mental hospitals during the 1960s and early '70s); S. SHEEHAN, IS THERE No PLACE ON
EARTH FOR ME? (1983) (detailing the conditions at the Creedmoor Psychiatric Center
through a thorough examination of the treatment of a paranoid schizophrenic named Sylvia
Frumkin); Lehmann, Possidente, & Hawken, The Quality of Life of Chronic Patients in a State
Hospital and in Community Residences, 37 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 901 (1986).
2. Kanter, Homeless Mentally Ill People: No Longer Out of Sight and Out of Mind, 3 N.Y.L.
SCH. HUM. RTs. ANN. 331 (1986) (with so many of the mentally ill receiving care and
treatment in the community instead of in institutions, the nation can no longer ignore the
existence of a mentally ill population). See Rapson, The Right of the Mentally Ill to Receive
Treatment in the Community, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 193, 194 (1980), who points to
the big turn-around from hospital to outpatient treatment during the heyday of deinstitutional-
ization. See Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness and Libertarian
Theory, 31 EMORY L. 375 (1982), for a thorough discussion of the effects of the
deinstitutionalization movement. Deinstitutionalization was a policy instituted by state
governments to reduce the vast numbers of mentally ill patients living in psychiatric facilities.
See infra note 9 for further discussion of deinstitutionalization.
3. Perlin, Rights of Ex-Patients in the Community: The Next Frontier?, 8 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 33, 34 (1980) [hereinafter The Next Frontier]. Professor Perlin suggests a
"logical progression" of recognizing legal rights for the poor, minorities, and those traditionally
isolated from mainstream society. This progression began with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954) and advanced to Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Professor Perlin asserts that mental patients and ex-
patients are just one class in a series of downtrodden groups now finding redress for civil
rights grievances through use of the legal system. The Next Frontier, supra at 34-35. See also
Perlin, Economic Rights of the Institutionalized Mentally Disabled, 10 INFrL J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
187 (1987); Perlin, Ten Years After Evolving Mental Health Advocacy and Judicial Trends, 15
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improved,' and numbers of mentally ill patients are being assimilated
back into society through the use of community mental health
facilities and hospital outpatient treatment programs.' Despite the
advances, however, new problems have been engendered.6
Great civil rights battles have been won, bringing about lesser
restraints on mental patients' liberty interests.7 However, despite this
FoDHm. URB. LJ. 335 (1986-87) [hereinafter Ten Years After]; See infra note 7.
4. Nonetheless, some cases are still being litigated on the issue of institutional conditions.
See, e.&, Doe v. Klein, 143 NJ. Super. 134, 362 A2d 1204 (App. Div. 1976).
5. Appelbaum, Outpatient Commitment: The Problems and the Promise, 143 AM. .
PSYCHIATRY 1270 (Oct. 1986) (identifying the problems inherent in state statutory provisions
permitting outpatient treatment: 1) provisions infrequently employed because the criteria for
outpatient care are often identical to those for inpatient commitment, and, 2) statutes
generally fail to provide enforcement mechanisms for patients who violate the conditions of
outpatient treatment).
Although mandatory outpatient treatment does not demonstrably reduce readmissions,
it may improve the quality of life of patients while living outside the hospital, reducing the
time spent in the hospital. See Bursten, Posthospital Mandatory Outpatient Treatment, 143
AM. . PSYCHIATRY 1255 (Oct. 1986). See also Coye, Rights of Recipients in Community
Residences, 8 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 491 (Sept.-Oct. 1984), for detailed
excerpts from the Michigan Department of Mental Health guidelines for dependent living
settings for mentally ill and developmentally disabled persons.
6. Early advocates of deinstitutionalization were overly optimistic about the ability of
released patients to survive, unaided in society, therefore they focused too heavily on
obtaining liberty for patients instead of seeking services for them. Rhoden, supra note 2, at
377. The ranks of the homeless, many ex-mental patients, have increased dramatically. See
generally Homelessness in America II: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and
Community Development of the House Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) (for various testimony of Congressional witnesses).
7. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) (case remanded to the court of appeals to
decide the issue of the right to refuse treatment with psychotropic medication. On remand,
the First Circuit recognized a due process right to refuse psychotropic medication under
Massachusetts law. Mills, 457 U.S. 291, remanded sub nom. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st
Cir. 1984); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (mentally retarded person, who was
involuntarily committed, has a constitutional right to: a) reasonably safe conditions of
confinement, b) freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints, and c) minimum adequate
training to reasonably assure security and freedom from undue bodily restraints); Rennie v.
Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (involuntarily committed mental patients have a
constitutional right to refuse medication and antipsychotic drugs which may only be
constitutionally administered when, in the exercise of professional judgment, such action is
deemed necessary to prevent the patient from endangering himself or others); Project Release
v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983) (the right to refuse medication was gleaned from
regulations providing objection to treatment); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) (constitutional right to treatment for civilly committed patients); Lake v. Cameron, 364
F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (right to treatment in the least restrictive environment mandated
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success, the numbers of ex-patients living on the streets, often in
life-threatening situations, has increased
The aftercare facilities that exist are simply too overburdened
and underfunded to handle the massive number of deinstitutional-
ized mental patients living in the community.9 So many of these ex-
patients, although not sick enough to be confined, lack the skills
necessary to cope in the "real world."" Sadly, many discharged
patients end up scratching out a meager existence on the streets."
Those of us living in major metropolitan areas are confronted daily
by these mentally ill castaways as we proceed to and from work.
The newspapers report tales of woe about these misfits of the
streets. 2 A current problem confronting mental health advocates is
under D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b)); Birl v. Wallis, 633 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1986)
(newly released patient cannot be reconfined to state mental hospital for purpose of
preventing further deterioration or danger to others without commitment hearing); but see
Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291 (8th Cir. 1987) (administration of
psychotherapeutic medicine against the will of patient did not violate due process); Rivers v.
Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 495 N.E.2d 337, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1986) (state may administer
antipsychotic medication pursuant to the police power, when patient presents immediate
danger to himself or others).
8. See Appleby & Desai, Documenting the Relationship Between Homelessness and Psychiatic
Hospitalization, 36 HosP. & COMMUNrrY PSYCHIATRY 732, 732 (1985); Rhoden, supra note 2,
at 375-76; Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 939,
939 n.3 (1984).
Another problem, often encountered, is that so many of the existing treatment facilities
prefer to treat the "worried well" as opposed to those with substantial mental health illnesses.
Interview with Michael L. Perlin, Professor of Law, New York Law School, in New York City
(Apr. 26, 1988).
9. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 194-97, 206-13. Contributing to this problem, for more
than a decade dischargees from public mental health facilities have exceeded admissions. See
S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 1, at 208. See also Winslow, Changing Trends
in CMHCs: Keys to Survival in the Eighties, 33 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 273 (1982).
10. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 194.
11. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 375-76 (quoting A. SCULL, DECARCERATON: COMMUNITY
TREATMENT AND THE DEVIANT:, A RADICAL VIEW 2 (1977)).
12. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, at B3, col. 2 (discussing new city programs to help
remove disturbed people from street). See also the highly publicized case of Boggs v. New
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1st Dep't 1987)
(involuntary commitment of mentally ill homeless woman supported by evidence that she did
not comprehend her need for food, clothing, or shelter, walked in front of moving cars, and
was in danger of assault because she screamed racial epithets). The Boggs case was ultimately
dismissed as moot by the New York Court of Appeals since the confining hospital had
released Billie Boggs after she refused to accept any psychotrophic medication. Boggs v. New
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how to help these mentally ill individuals assume healthy and
productive lives in our society. This paper seeks to show what has
happened to the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, to identify the legal
rights available to ex-patients in the community, and to suggest ways
these rights may be realized by these social outcasts. 3 In particular,
the plight of ex-mental patients, now cast adrift in the community,
will be examined in depth. 4
IL THE DENST[rUTONALIZATION MOVEMENT
The strides made toward deinstitutionalization, largely brought
about through the recognition of a legal right to treatment in the
least restrictive environment," may be fairly touted as the greatest
York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972,520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
13. See generally Coye, supra note 5; Freddolino, Findings from the National Mental Health
Advocacy Survey, 7 MENTAL DISABILrTY L. REP. 416 (Sept.-Oct. 1983); Parry, Rights and
Entitlements in the Community, in S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 1, at 607
[hereinafter Rights]; Ten Years After, supra note 3.
14. See generally, Kanter, supra note 2; The Next Frontier, supra note 3; Rhoden, supra
note 2; Note, Building a House of Legal Rights: A Plea for the Homeless, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
531 (1982); M. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL & CRIMINAL 671-95 (1989).
15. The seminal case of O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), was the initial
victory for mental patients who, until then, had been warehoused in mental hospitals. The
Supreme Court ruled that "a State cannot constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing
and responsible family members or friends" based solely on his mental illness. Id. at 576.
This marked the beginning of a legal right to treatment. As Justice Burger aptly pointed
out in his concurrence: a state cannot "lawfully confine an individual thought to need
treatment and justify that deprivation of liberty solely by providing some treatment." Id. at
589.
After O'Connor, mental health advocates went to work on securing the further right to
treatment in the least restrictive environment. Many courts have recognized this right,
although the Supreme Court, thus far, has declined to go so far. See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir.
1982) (future commitment unwarranted absent individual determination that a community
living arrangement or other less restrictive environment unsuitable); Covington v. Harris, 419
F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (least restrictive alternative, principle equally applicable to
alternative dispositions within a mental hospital); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir.
1966); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (right to treatment by
placement in alternative facilities when appropriate); Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the
Supreme Court, 14 RuToEs L.J. 595, 634-35 (1983); but see Society for Goodwill v. Cuomo,
737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (no entitlement to the least restrictive environment under the
federal constitution); Johnson er rel. Johnson v. Brelje, 701 F.2d. 1201 (7th Cir. 1983) (due
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victory of all for mental patients. Unfortunately, the abuses suffered
by these individuals while living in mental institutions has been
supplanted by the abusiveness of a cold, cruel world ill-equipped to
care for these nomads.'6 The flaw in the deinstitutionalization
process is that even though these patients were entitled to release
from the institution, inadequate community treatment centers existed
to help these dischargees adapt to the outside world.'7 To remedy
this situation, release must be conditioned on continuing community
or outpatient treatment." This procedure aims to assure successful
reintegration of these individuals into society. Aside from continued
treatment, ex-patients must be apprised of their legal rights in the
community." With knowledge and exercise of their rights, this
group can rejoin our society.
Today, ex-mental patients can assert several rights to better
their human condition. These include voting rights," parental
process does not guarantee right to least restrictive environment money can buy).
16. See Appleby & Desai, supra note 8, at 736-37; Bassuk, Rubin & Lauriat, Is
Homelessness a Mental Health Problem? 141 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 1546, 1548-49 (1984); Kanter,
supra note 2, at 342-43, 356-57.
17. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 194; Rhoden, supra note 2, at 375-77.
18. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 195; Rhoden, supra note 2, at 376-77. Liability concerns
may preclude outpatient commitment, but such fears seem ill-founded. See Killeen v. State,
66 N.Y.2d 850, 489 N.E.2d 245, 498 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1985) (decision to place patient in
program to prepare him for life outside institution is a medical judgment, for which no
liability could be imposed on state for injuries sustained by patient in program); Schrempf v.
State, 66 N.Y.2d 289, 487 N.E.2d 883, 496 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1985) (state psychiatrist's failure
to intervene in some manner upon belief that mental patient on outpatient status was not
taking medication did not impose liability on state for death of man killed by patient).
Of course, not all releases need to continue on outpatient treatment, but even those
dischargees with less severe mental health problems could benefit from community aftercare
services which help these ex-patients ease their way back into society. Where no aftercare
facilities exist in the community, it becomes a medical decision whether a patient seeking
release can survive on his own outside the institution.
19. Lecklitner & Greenberg, Promoting the Rights of the Chronically Mentally Ill in the
Community: A Report on the Patient Rights Policy Research Project, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 422 (Sept.-Oct. 1983).
20. See Manhattan Citizens' Group v. Bass, 524 F. Supp. 1270, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
Parry, Decision-making Rights over Persons and Property, in S. BRAKEL, J. PARRY, & B.
WEINER, supra note 1, at 435, 445-46) [hereinafter Decision-making]; Note, supra note 14, at
547-53.
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rights,"' right to counsel," right to expungement of records, 2" right
to freedom from discrimination in employment,' and a possible right
to shelter for the mentally ill homeless, which some jurisdictions
recognize.' These rights, together with the right to aftercare in the
community,2' can bring the promise of a better life for ex-mental
patients.
21. See, e.&, Lehmann v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502 (1982),
where a writ of habeas corpus filed by a mother with "limited social and intellectual
development" to regain custody of her three children from a county social services agency did
not confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to consider collateral challenges to state court
judgments involuntarily terminating parental rights.
22. See Rights, supra note 13, at 677-84.
23. See Decision-making supra note 20, at 465-66.
24. See Rights, supra note 13, at 648-57.
25. See Note, supra note 8, at 939; Note, supra note 14, at 531; In re Commitment of S.D.,
212 NJ. Super. 211, 514 A.2d 844 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (findings that a patient in a
mental institution was unable to care for himself outside of the institution did not support an
order continuing patient's commitment); In re Commitment of B.H., 212 NJ. Super. 145, 514
A.2d 85 (Law Div. 1986) (summary revocation of patient's conditional discharge status by
recommitment for actions such as not attending outpatient program or taking prescribed
medication, constituted violation of patient's due process rights, since it was not done by court
of review); Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 NJ. Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416 (Law Div. 1986) (plan
to shelter homeless); In re Carl C., 126 A.D.2d 640, 511 N.Y.S.2d 144 (2d Dep't 1987)
(patient did not pose direct threat of physical harm to himself or others such as resulting
from refusal or inability to meet essential needs for food, clothing, or shelter); In re Harry
M., 96 A.D.2d 201, 468 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1983) (individual incapable of surviving
without care and assistance provided by institutionalized setting poses clear danger to himself
under involuntary commitment statute; this may be evidenced by failure to meet essential
needs for food, clothing, or shelter); Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec.
5, 1981) (homeless men are entitled to board and lodging); Eldredge v. Koch, 98 A.D.2d
675, 469 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1983) Chomeless women are constitutionally entitled to
treatment equal to that accorded to homeless men." Id. at 676, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 745.);
McCain v. Koch, 117 A.D.2d 198, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (1st Dep't 1986) (right to emergency
housing for families recognized); Mixon v. Phillips, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 24, 1989, at 22, col. 5 (Sup.
Ct. 1989); People v. Merrill, 123 Misc. 2d 498, 474 N.Y.S.2d 198 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (whether
or not an individual is suitable for community living must be left to sound medical judgment);
but see, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no constitutional right to shelter); Williams
v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (no right to shelter).
26. Rapson, supra note 2; Rhoden, supra note 2; infra notes 29-72 and accompanying text
discussing the right to aftercare.
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Once a mental patient is released into the community, he must
fend for himself. For some, the task is not insurmountable, but for
many, the routine events of everyday living are not so routine.
Finding living arrangements, such as an apartment, is nearly
impossible, acquiring a job improbable, and just learning where to
begin is frightening. Here, ex-patients' groups can assist newly
discharged patients in daily living skills.' Many ex-patients may have
no marketable job skills and are therefore dependent on government
aid for mere sustenance.' Several government programs, such as
Welfare, Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security Supplemental
Income can benefit these lost individuals.' Unfortunately, too many
do not know how to go about filing for these benefits.' Mental
health agencies must develop legal aid centers to help these ex-
patients back on their feet. Without assistance, these individuals
may quickly join the ranks of the homeless mentally ill or become
recommitted to institutions." The goal of the mental health system
is to bring these people back into society for their own benefit and
the benefit of us all. Greater revenues devoted to community
service will supply the means for ex-patients to readjust to the
world. Without adequate aftercare, the deinstitutionalization process
27. Without the ability to carry on day to day functions, routine to most adults, many
former mental patients, unable to readjust to society, are readmitted to institutions or join
the ranks of the homeless. A list of advocacy groups is compiled in B. ENNIS & R. EMERY,
THE AMERICAN CML LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 216-
19 (1978); See also Federation For Community Planning, Community-Sponsored Cooperative
Apartments: A Handbook on how Volunteers Can Establish Cooperative Apartments for Former
Mental Hospital Patients, 10 LAw & HOUSING J. 37 (1982-83); Lecklitner & Greenberg, supra
note 19, at 422; Rapson, supra note 2, at 196, 252-55.
28. Others may have lost their social skills while institutionalized as a result of iatrogenic
illness and/or tardive dyskinesia. See Rennie v. Klein, 482 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (D.N.J. 1978)
(for a discussion of the side effects of psychotrophic medication). Tardive dyskinesia is
evidenced by repetitive, involuntary movements of the tongue, face, mouth, or jaw, sometimes
accompanied by other bizarre muscular activity. Id.
29. For a thorough analysis of such programs, see Rights, supra note 13, at 670-77.
30. Many of these programs require verification of a "bona fide" residence before benefits
may be received, this requirement, in effect, denies all homeless individuals access to such
programs. See Note, supra note 14, at 533-37.
31. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 206-17; Rhoden, supra note 2, at 421 n. 211.
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can only fail.3'
IV. ESTABLISHING A RIGHT To AFTERCARE
Sadly, these ex-patients return to society with the stigma
associated with mental illness.33 The only true means of overcoming
this stigma is through improved mental health. Bettering their
condition has not been easy, since the United States Supreme Court
has not recognized a federal constitutional right to aftercare.' Such
a right, however, may be established under state constitutional law.35
A. Right To Shelter
Hopefully, successful litigation on related issues will bring about
better aftercare for ex-mental patients in the community. In
Callahan v. Carey,' a class of New York City's homeless men
asserted a right to shelter under the New York State Constitution
and the Social Service Law.37 A majority of these men were
32. See Rhoden, supra note 2 at 376-77.
33. Stigmatic effects of institutionalization include society's generalized attitudes of distrust,
anxiety, and hostility toward former mental patients. This "scarlet letter" may affect an ex-
patient's ability to locate housing, secure and hold a job, and enjoy legal privileges. Rapson,
supra note 2, at 199; Armstrong, Conference Report-Stigma: Its Impact on the Mentally Ill, 31
HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY PSYCHOLOGY 342 (1980); Gove & Fain, The Stigma of Mental
Hospitalization, 28 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 494 (1973). See, A. BROOKS, supra note 1,
at 646 (for a list of articles analyzing the stigma problem). See also Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979); In re Ballay 482 F.2d 648, 651-52 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
34. Aftercare refers to community-based supportive services for discharged mental patients.
Although the Supreme Court has ruled that nondangerous mentally ill individuals can not be
warehoused if they are able to live by themselves or with assistance in the community,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975), the Court has so far left undecided the
issue of whether the states are constitutionally obligated to provide community support
services to enable mentally ill and disabled persons to be released from institutions. See,
Rights, supra note 13, at 620-22, for a summary of the current state of the law on the
aftercare issue.
35. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled:
The Last Frontier?, 20 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1249 (1987).
36. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1981).
37. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (which provides that: "[he aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions,
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mentally ill; they had been discharged when the standards for
continued commitment in New York were changed. Under the new
admissions criteria, individuals who would have been confined under
the former law, were now forced to fend for themselves.' The case
was settled by a consent decree whereby the city agreed to provide
food, shelter, and security to all the men applying for shelter. 9
In another New York case, Klosternann v. Cuomo,' the New
York Coalition for the Homeless sought recognition of a constitu-
tional and statutory right to aftercare for homeless ex-mental
patients. 1 The state's highest court recognized that the plaintiffs,
who were denied community placement provided to others with less
severe mental conditions, stated a valid claim for relief under both
federal and state equal protection clauses. 2
B. Right to Treatment
Since a new dischargee from an institution had been previously
confined for treatment under the state's parens patriae powers, the
dischargee's right to treatment, a right implicitly recognized by the
United States Supreme Court,43 further entitles him to such care as
and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine"
Id.). N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 62(1), 131(3) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 604, § 604-1.0(b) (1978).
38. Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1981).
39. Id. at 2-13.
40. Klosterman v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984).
41. Id at 535-41, 465 N.E.2d at 593-96, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 252-55.
42. Id. at 532, 463 N.E.2d at 591, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
43. The right to treatment is premised on the fourteenth amendment right to liberty.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (established that confining a nondangerous
mental patient for the stated purpose of treating his illness without providing necessary
treatment, violates that person's liberty interest). The right to treatment was extended in state
and federal courts to include a right to treatment in the least restrictive environment. The
United States Supreme Court has not yet explicitly recognized this right. The next step has
been for some courts to find a right to community aftercare services based on the right to
treatment in the least restrictive environment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) ("[to] deprive any citizen of his or her
liberty interest upon the altruistic theory that confinement is for human therapeutic reasons
and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates due process." Id. at 785); but see Doe v.
Public Health Trust of Dade County, 696 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1983) (voluntary, minor mental
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is needed in the community." This argument supplies a link
between the already recognized right to treatment and the presently
unrecognized right to aftercare. Moreover, the right to treatment
in the least restrictive environment, first recognized in Lake v.
Cameron,45 supports a theory of a right to treatment in the com-
munity.4' Lake v. Cameron, although decided on statutory grounds,
has stood as precedent for many later cases asserting the right to a
least restrictive alternative for treatment. Only two years later in
Covington v. Harris,47 Judge Bazelon extended the right to a least
restrictive placement within a mental institution. ' This doctrine has
set the stage for arguments in support of a right to community
aftercare. Although this new found principle has failed in several
instances,49 recent cases demonstrate a willingness on the part of
some courts to embrace this theory."0 For instance, Thomas S. v.
patient has no constitutional right to treatment in the least restrictive environment).
44. See Note, supra note 8, at 951-56.
45. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
46. Rhoden, supra note 2, at 385-86, 422-24; see also Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp.
974 (D.D.C. 1975) (right to treatment in the least restrictive environment based on statutory
grounds).
47. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48. Id.
49. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (no constitutional right to shelter); Lelsz v.
Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1987) (vacating consent decree establishing a least
restrictive alternative setting as minimum standard of care for mentally retarded patients'
habitation requiring community placements); Society for Goodwill to Retarded Citizens, Inc.
v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239 (2d Cir. 1984) (residents not constitutionally entitled to community
placement); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1983) (absent contention mentally
retarded adults denied access to community residential facilities because of their handicap,
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1973), has no application to claim that state has
an affirmative duty to create less restrictive community residential settings for them); Williams
v. Barry, 708 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (no right to shelter in the community).
50. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986),
479 U.S. 869 (1986) (right to minimally adequate treatment for incompetent, even though
released from state hospital); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 107
S. Ct. 459 (1986); Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (right to treatment
by placement in alternative facilities when appropriate); New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 89 N.J. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982) (the State
Department of Human Services is required to provide a spectrum of settings in which
programming can be given to mentally retarded); Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 NJ. Super.
434, 524 A-2d 416 (Law Div. 1986); Patients v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders,
No. L-33417-74 (N.J. Super. Ct., Jan. 19, 1981); Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459
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Morrow,5 a 1986 decision from the Fourth Circuit, held that a
released incompetent from a state hospital is entitled to minimally
adequate treatment.52 An extension of this view is that not only
mental dischargees, but others who voluntarily present themselves
for treatment in the community, are entitled to a right to community
aftercare."
C. Discharged Conditioned on Continued
Community Aftercare
The lack of success in the fight for aftercare has in part
stemmed from a lack of community treatment facilities.54 Several
courts ordering release of mental patients have conditioned
discharge on appropriate placement in the community." Absent
proper facilities, these patients end up classified as "discharged
pending placement,"'56 forced to remain in confinement until proper
community treatment becomes available.
N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (right to shelter), rev'd on other grounds, 98 A.D.2d 675, 469
N.Y.S.2d 744 (1st Dep't 1983); Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y Sup. Ct, Dec. 5, 1981);
In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429 A.2d 631 (1981) (Pennsylvania Mental Health/Mental
Retardation Act, 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1988) requires
state to provide care in least restrictive environment).
51. Thomas S., 781 F.2d at 367.
52. Id. at 374-75.
53. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 426-27.
54. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 206-13; Lecklitner & Greenberg, supra note 19, at 422;
Beiser, Shore, Peters, & Tatum, Does Community Care For The Mentally Ill Make A
Difference? A Tale Of Two Cities, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY. 1047 (Sept. 1985); Scull, Mental
Patients And The Community: A Critical Note, 9 IrL J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 383 (1986).
55. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982);
Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (the district court found no residential
settings available, thus compelling Ms. Lake to continue hospital confinement); Dixon v.
Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); K.P. v. Albanese, 204 N.J. Super. 166, 497 A.2d
1276 (App. Div. 1985) (exercise of clinical judgment in assignment of privilege level to mental
patient eligible for discharge pending placement to effectuate treatment goals did not impinge
on patient's right to least restrictive conditions necessary to achieve purposes of treatment).
56. In re Commitment of S.L., 94 NJ. 128, 462 A.2d 1252 (1983) (parens patriae
commitment of dischargees pending placement in community until proper supportive settings
available outside institution); see also Perlin, Discharged Pending Placement: The Due Process
Rights Of The Nondangerous Institutionalized Mentally Handicapped With Nowhere To Go, 5
DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHIATRY 1 (1985).
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Some states have statutory discharge planning requirements,
embodying a right to community aftercare." Such legislative
schemes are commendable since they exhibit the proper forethought,
taking the best interests of the mental patient into account.58  At
least, under these plans, patients are not prematurely released when
inadequate support services exist to treat discharged patients.
D. Aftercare Premised on Fourteenth Amendment
A further argument in support of a right to community-based
treatment stems from the fourteenth amendment59 under the
presupposition that a dischargee has a right to continued mental
health service in the community.' This right is based on the
patient's reliance on these services under a Perry v. Sindermann6t
analysis. Former patients, now struggling in the community, as a
result of inadequate community placement, may make an aftercare
claim based on improper state action.62 Especially where these ex-
patients have been confined for lengthy periods of time, thereby
diminishing their capacity to survive independently upon release, a
constitutional claim to continued treatment in the community is
possible.' One commentator has thoughtfully posited this view,'
57. See Rapson, supra note 2, at 246. For a comprehensive list of applicable statutes see
Rights, supra note 13, at 626-27.
58. Notably, so far only thirteen states and the District of Columbia have statutes that
require or encourage services in the least restrictive environment. Rights, supra note 13, at
627. Only three of those (Colorado, District of Columbia and Wisconsin) create a specific
entitlement to community services or deinstitutionalization. Id.
59. U.S. CONs7. amend. XIV, §1.
60. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
61. Id. The entitlement to continued treatment is premised on the "mutually explicit
understanding" doctrine. Under that theory, an individual has the expectation that a
government benefit will not be discontinued because state action has led him to anticipate and
depend on it. Id. at 601. "[A] person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due
process purposes if there are such... mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
of entitlement to the benefit that he may invoke at a hearing." Id.
62. See Rhoden, supra note 2, at 427.
63. Id.
64. Note, supra note 8, at 970-71; but see Robbins v. Reagan, 780 F.2d 37 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (residents of shelter can not claim they relied on government promise to their
detriment by choosing to live at shelter instead of in the streets).
[Vol VI
1988] NOTES 147
however, it has not been tested before the courts.
E. Right to Minimal Habitation or Treatment
in Least Restrictive Environment
Despite the failure of the United States Supreme Court to
recognize a constitutional right to community mental health
services,65 the battle rages on in state and federal district courts
where plaintiffs seek to assert this right." In the seminal case of
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hospital,' a federal district
court finding a constitutional right to minimal habilitation or
treatment in the least restrictive environment, provided the basis for
an order directing the state to provide community living arrange-
ments for most of the hospital's residents." Even though the
decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court on other
grounds, the decision is still cited favorably by other courts.69 Many
jurisdictions fail to recognize a right to community-based treatment,70
but recent litigation demonstrates that there is public support for the
right to aftercare.71 Three'states explicitly authorize an entitlement
to community services or deinstitutionalization.' At the very least,
65. See, e.&, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
66. See Perlin, supra note 35, at 1249.
67. Haldermann v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1982).
68. Id. at 651-56.
69. See Phillip v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 518 (N.D.N.Y. 1981); Medley v. Ginsberg, 492
F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1980).
70. See In re Expungement of Commitment Records of H, 151 NJ. Super. 372, 376 A.2d
1292 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); see also discussion in Rights, supra note 13, at 627,
pertaining to the lack of state statutes authorizing community treatment.
71. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986),
479 U.S. 869 (1986); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d. Cir. 1986) (applying right to
community treatment) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 459 (1986); Maticka v. Atlantic City, 216 N.J.
Super. 434, 524 A.2d 416 (Law Div. 1986); In re S.L., 94 NJ. Super. 128, 462 A.2d 1252
(App. Div. 1983); Patients v. Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, No. 33417-74 P.W.
(NJ. Super Ct., Jan. 19, 1981); Klostermann v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 463 N.E.2d 588, 475
N.Y.S.2d 247 (1984); Eldredge v. Koch, 118 Misc. 2d 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1983);
Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Dec. 5, 1981); In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 429
A.2d 631 (1981).
72. District of Columbia, by judicial decision, Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974
(D.D.C. 1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 27-10-101(a) & (b) (1982); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.61(3)(e)
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some states have statutory discharge planning requirements mandat-
ing aftercare supervision to released mental patients.' The New
York scheme requires that the releasing facility "take all necessary
steps to obtain an adequate supply of safe, convenient and ap-
propriate housing for patients to be discharged or conditionally
released."' Further, mandatory outpatient treatment offers a viable
alternative in many instances.'
F. Zoning for Community Treatment Facilities
Aiding the quest for better community services are recent
court holdings striking down discriminatory zoning ordinances
excluding community mental health facilities from residential areas. 6
(West Supp. 1984). See also Rights, supra note 13, at 627.
73. Patients v. Camden County Bd. of Choosen Freehoders, No. L-33417-74 (N.J. Super.
Ct., Jan. 19, 1981). This case has gone the furthest in recognizing a right of community
care. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-24.2(e) (West 1982).
74. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.15(9) (McKinney Supp. 1981); see also N.Y. COMp.
CODE R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 36.4(a) (1973).
75. See Appelbaum, supra note 5; Bursten, supra note 5.
76. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (zoning or-
dinance discriminatory); J.W. v. City of Tacoma, 720 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1983) (zoning
ordinance discriminating against former mental patients); Stoner v. Miller, 377 F. Supp. 177
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (hotel and boarding house ordinance provisions prohibiting registration of
persons requiring continuous medical or psychiatric services unconstitutional, particularly in
light of movement toward deinstitutionalization in treatment of mentally ill); City of Livonia
v. Department of Social Servs., Nos. 70315, 70316, 71155, 71377 (Mich. Sup. Ct., Nov. 21,
1985) (court upholds placement of small group homes serving six or fewer persons in
residential neighborhoods against exclusionary zoning ordinances); Township of Piscataway v.
Concerned Citizens for Chronic Psychiatric Adults, 200 NJ. Super. 615, 491 A.2d 1333 (App.
Div. 1985) (community residence for mentally ill not required to be licensed pursuant to
statute governing community residences for mentally retarded and developmentally disabled);
Crane Neck Ass'n v. New York City Long Island County Servs. Group, 61 N.Y.2d 154, 460
N.E.2d 1336, 472 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1984) (covenant prohibiting maintenance of other than
single family dwelling not equitably enforceable because it contravenes public policy favoring
establishment of residences for mentally disabled); Town of Hempstead v. Commissioner of
New York Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 112 A.D.2d 1042, 493
N.Y.S.2d 29 (2d Dep't 1985) (establishment of community residential facility at contested
location ruled proper under N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 41.34(c)(5) (McKinney 1978));
Human Dev. Servs. of Port Chester, v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, 493 N.Y.S.2d
481 (2d Dep't 1985) (denial of variance for residential facilty for mentally disabled was abuse
of discretion in light of strong public policy favoring such facilities); City of Oswego v.
Prevost, 91 A.D.2d 848, 458 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (city's untimely objection to
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The leading case on exclusionary zoning of homes for the mentally
disabled is City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Center,' where the
Supreme Court invalidated a zoning ordinance which impermissibly
excluded a home for mentally retarded citizens from a residential
neighborhood, because there was no rational basis to believe that
the home for the mentally retarded posed "any special threat to the
city's legitimate interests."'8 Mere negative attitudes and unsubstan-
tiated fears about the mentally disabled are not proper interests
justifying discriminatory treatment under the zoning laws.' Cleburne,
along with other recent cases,' demonstrates a strong public policy
favoring the establishment of residential mental health facilities.
This policy will open barriers to residential living arrangements
previously foreclosed to mental and ex-mental patients.
V. ESTABLISHED LEGAL RIGHTS
Although the right to aftercare in the community is not a
presently established right, the discharged mental patient can
nonetheless rely on other recognized legal rights in the community.8
proposed site of community residential facility for mentally handicapped confers approval by
inaction); see also 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
17.1-17A.98 (chs. 17 & 17A) (6th ed. 1986).
77. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432; see, Margulies, The Newest Equal Protection: City Of
Clebume And A Common Law For Statutes And Covenants Affecting Group Homes For The
Mentally Disabled, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RiS. ANN. 359 (1986).
78. City of Clebume, 473 U.S. at 448.
79. Id. at 448-50; see also Township of Piscataway, 200 NJ. Super. at 165, 491 A2d 1333
(community residence for mentally ill not required to be licensed pursuant to statute
governing community residences for mentally retarded and developmentally disabled); Coalter,
Michigan Supreme Court Upholds Community Placement Laws, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DisABILrry L. REP. 65 (Jan.-Feb. 1986); Schonfeld, Not In My Neighborhood: Legal Challenges
To The Establishment Of Community Residences For The Mentally Disabled In New York State,
13 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 281 (1985); Note, Mental Health Community Commitment: To Accept
or Refect the Mentally Ill? - City of Torrance v. Transitional Living Centers, Inc., 30 CaL 3d 516,
638 P.2d 1304, 179 CaL Rptr. 907 (1982), 5 WHrrIER L. REV. 417 (1982).
80. See supra note 76, and accompanying text.
81. For a discussion of rights such as access to courts, contractual, wills, professional
licensing, right to vote, holding political office, jury duty and testifying in court see Decision-
making, supra note 20, at 436-47; Note, supra note 14, at 547-50; Lyon-Levine, Levine,
Zusman, Developments in Patients' Bill of Rights Since the Mental Health Systems Act, 9
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Even though the right to aftercare would establish the most
supportive means of obtaining relief from the ex-mental patients'
separation from society, shelter from their condition can be at least,
in part, secured from this list of already recognized rights of ex-
mental patients. By relying on these rights, a portion of their battle
towards assimilation back into society has already been won.' The
major obstacle in this regard is making the mentally ill cognizant of
these rights. This can be best accomplished through community
support advocacy programs. Although at the present time, many such
programs exist,' further progress could still be made if state and
local governments would apportion more resources to this cause.
A. Economic Rights and Entitlements
Presently, there exist a number of federal and state programs
and statutes conferring economic benefits and entitlements for
mentally disabled individuals.' An in-depth analysis of each of these
programs is beyond the scope of this paper, however a brief
discussion of some of these rights is warranted.
1. Freedom from Employment and Housing Discrimination
The ex-mental patient's freedom from discrimination in housing
and employment based on his ex-mental patient status goes a long
way toward facilitating his ability to live a productive life in our
society." Most states have statutes prohibiting this type of dis-
crimination,' and case law supports this antidiscriminatory
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISAB. L. REP. 2, 146, 147 (1985); see generally Rights, supra note 13
(for a detailed analysis of federal reform in this area).
82. Rights, supra note 13, at 619.
83. Id. at 676-83; see also Freddolino, supra note 13, at 416, for a study of mental health
rights and advocacy programs.
84. These include Social Security benefit programs, health service benefit programs,
freedom from employment discrimination, educational benefits, right to counsel, freedom from
discrimination in housing, state statutes governing group homes and community residences,
legal advocacy services. Rights, supra note 13, at 608-14.




goal.' Besides preventing job and housing discrimination, many
states have laws granting workers' and unemployment compensation
to individuals incurring mental illness as a result of on the job
physical injury.' Some states even hold that mental illness is a
compensable occupational illness when a preexisting mental
condition is aggravated by job stress." Some employers, of course,
fear the added cost of insurance occasioned by employing a former
mental patient." This fear is not unsubstantiated, since most
insurers routinely charge higher premiums for mentally disabled
individuals because they are deemed a higher risk group.91 New
legislation spreading this increased risk to the general population
could, however, remedy the added costs incurred by employers and
thereby offer more incentive for them to hire the mentally disabled.'
2. Public Benefit Programs
Further public benefits such as Social Security and Medicare
can be of tremendous help to struggling discharged patients who
are unable to find work.93 The greatest problem in this area is that
so many of these individuals do not know how to go about applying
87. Newman v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of N.Y., 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert denied, 95 S. Ct. 1447 (1975) (forced leave of absence based on nonadversary
determination that teacher was psychologically unfit to teach violated teacher's due process
rights); Smith v. Schlesinger, 513 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (grant of security clearance may
be denied to mental patients if illness may cause significant defects in judgment); Lombard
v. Board of Educ. of New York, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974) (teacher had due process right
to hearing before termination of employment based on finding he engaged in illogical,
disoriented conversation); Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973) (a chauffeur
license denial based on fourteen year old psychiatric records without checking applicant's
present mental condition violates due process); Hurley v. Allied Chemical Corp., 164 W. Va.
268, 262 S.E.2d 757 (1980) (implied cause of action under state statute against private
employer denying employment to otherwise qualified person based on individual's receipt of
mental health services).
88. Rights, supra note 13, at 656.
89. Id. at 658.
90. Id at 657.
91. Id at 670.
92. Id
93. This public assistance may, however, be denied to individuals lacking a fixed legal
residence. Note, supra note 14, at 531-37.
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for these benefits.' Again, community support services for ex-
patients would enable them to exercise their rights and reap the
benefits of these programs.
B. Decision-making Rights
1. Wills
Aside from the above-mentioned entitlement rights of ex-
mental patients, the discharged patient is also afforded further
decision-making rights." For instance, the ex-mental patient, unless
adjudged incompetent or not of "sound mind and memory" will be
permitted to make a will.' Even if many ex-patients have few
assets to devise, the power to distribute one's own property upon
death is of great importance to everyone.'
2. Parental Rights
Generally, an ex-patient's parental rights will not be dimin-
ished." Ex-patient status is not grounds to restrict an individual's
family rights and decision-making rights pertaining to one's children.'
Naturally, an ex-mental patient is held to the same standard of
conduct vis-a-vis his children as a person without this stigmatizing
label."°
94. Id at 533-37.
95. Decision-making supra note 20, at 439-41.
96. Id See also DUKEMINIER & JOHNSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES, 137-40 (3d ed.
1984).
97. See Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987) ("the right to pass on property - - to one's
family in particular - - has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal times."
Id at 2083.)







The right to vote, guaranteed under the Constitution,'' is a
privilege afforded ex-mental patients so long as they are not
adjudged incompetent.10 The restrictions on voting are governed
by statute in every state,103 but generally speaking, since discharged
patients are seldom labeled incompetent, the franchise is not denied
to them.Y The greatest problems arise for those discharged patients
without a residence. Without a mailing address, the homeless
mentally ill are denied voting rights."5 The limitations imposed on
discharges regarding voting rights are very similar to those regarding
holding public office" or serving on a jury. 7 In contrast, a mentally
disabled individual is not prohibited from testifying in court.1'8
4. Driving and Professional Licensing
Most states have legislation which disqualifies mentally ill
persons from acquiring driving and professional licenses." General-
ly, a finding of mental illness will require revocation of existing
licenses.110 Procedures vary as to reinstatement of licenses after the
individual's condition has improved.' Denial of a license based on
101. Voting is a fundamental right protected by the fourteenth amendment. Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966);
see also Carroll v. Cobb, 139 NJ. Super. 439, 354 A.2d 355 (App. Div. 1976) (impermissible
to presume residents of state school for the retarded are "idiots or insane" and thus ineligible
to register to vote).
102. Decision-making supra note 20, at 446.
103. See, Note, supra note 14, at 550-52; Decision-making, supra note 20, at 445-46.
104. Note, supra note 14, at 549.
105. See id at 547-48.
106. See Decision-making supra note 20, at 446.
107. Id at 447.
108. Id
109. Id at 441-44; Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.N.C. 1974).
110. Thirty-one states place members of specific professions on probation if they have
mental problems. Decision-making supra note 20, at 442. Some states require a due process
hearing prior to revocation, suspension, or denial of a driver's license. Id at 444.
111. Id
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a prior condition is, however, unconstitutional."u
5. Expungement of Mental Health Records
An important right facilitating the removal of the stigma
associated with mental illness is the expungement of mental health
records."3 Improvement of the discharged patient's condition is
needed before this right can be exercised. 4 Still, some jurisdictions
asserting the state purpose of retaining records for possible future
treatment, will not allow expungement. 5 Expungement can be a
valuable means of building a "new life" by enabling an ex-patient to
rejoin society without the problems associated with his status as an
ex-mental patient. Especially in light of the frequent abuses of this
information by insurance companies and government agencies
providing health benefits, expungement is an important aid to the
ex-patient seeking to disassociate himself from his prior illness. 6
VI. CONCLUSION
The mentally ill have seen their position in society make a
turn for the better in the past twenty years. Particularly, the right
to treatment in the least restrictive environment, which spawned the
deinstitutionalization movement in our country, was of supreme
importance in securing a better way of life for this nation's mentally
ill population. Regrettably, our society was not prepared to embrace
these dischargees and draw them back into the mainstream of our
society. The paucity and inadequacy of existing facilities pushed
many ex-mental patients onto the streets, resulting in increased
homelessness in addition to readmissions to mental hospitals.
Fortunately, mental health advocates have started the crusade for
112. See Freitag v. Carter, 489 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1973).
113. See In re Expungement of Commitment Records of H., 151 N.J. Super. 372, 376 A.2d
1292 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1977); Decision-making, supra note 20, at 465-66; The Next
Frontier, supra note 3, at 38.
114. See Decision-making, supra note 20, at 465.




better services and a right to shelter and aftercare for these social
outcasts. Even though there is more to be done, especially in the
fight for a right to community treatment, strides have been made.
The cry of the mentally ill homeless is being heard, many rights have
been secured already, and the stage has been set for more rights
and a better way of life to come to our discharged mentally ill. Let
us not desert these people in their hour of need by regressing back
to conditions of earlier years, but instead afford the necessary time,
funds, and compassion to help these individuals assume productive
and satisfying roles in our society.
Mark S. Dennison

